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BOOK REVIEW
LISTEN, YANKEE. By C. Wright Mills, New York, Ballantine Books, 1960.

Pp. 192.
There is a curious ambivalence in American coverage of controversial international developments. Most of the newspapers and periodicals tend to be
conservative in their evaluation of new movements in underdeveloped countries.
Trends towards free enterprise are lauded. Left-wing tendencies of all shades
are viewed with reserve, if not outright hostility. And the "national interest"
is tacitly defined as if it meant the indefinite continuation of past American
policies. On the other hand, books on the same subjects are apt to favor
radical movements, to be suspicious of unrestrained capitalism in underdeveloped areas, and to be critical of the direction of American foreign policy in
these areas.
One of the most recent examples of this ambivalence is the treatment of
the Castro revolution in Cuba. While the bulk of newspaper reporting on
Castro has been hostile since early 1959, most of the books on the subject have
been friendly. C. Wright Mills' Listen, Yankee is the latest, and, in some respects, the most interesting of this friendly series. Most of this brief, easily
readable book is a presentation of the Oro-Castro case from the point of view
of a fictitious composite Cuban. Only in the last chapter does Mills make it
clear that, with one or two reservations, he agrees with the analysis he has out-

lined.
The argument in Listen, Yankee can be summarized briefly. In the first

place, while the United States has, for many decades, made its power felt in
Cuba, it has used this power for the short-run interest of its strategic commitments, its private investors, and its tourists. In implementing these goals, it
has supported men like Batista who have thwarted the realization of Cuban
aspirations.
Secondly, the Castro revolution was originally a rebellion of middleclass
intellectuals who wanted both political freedom from Batista terror and a
socio-economic overhauling of Cuba which would make the natural wealth of
Cuba available to its people. It was the contact with the "peasantry," especially
of eastern Cuba, that made them more radical in their agrarian program. And
the early industrial expropriations were directed against industries owned by
Batista men, whose capital had been corruptly acquired from government
sources and whose interests lay in grabbing fast, dishonest profits from these
industries rather than productive expansion. But it was the counter-revolutionary effort, stimulated by the policies of the United States, which caused most
of the unexpected tendencies of the Fidelists.
Thirdly, while Castro's movement has been socialism or Marxism of a sort,
it has been a Cuban type, not Chinese or Russian or communist at all. Unlike
China, the agrarian reform moved quickly and painlessly into collectivization,
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because most of the Cuban "peasants" were not interested in being farm proprietors. Unlike Russia, it has increased agricultural production because under
the old latifundia system, huge areas of land lay idle, awaiting a boom in the
sugar market. Unlike both China and Russia, the plans for industrialization
called for more consumer industries before heavy industrialization. The revolution was consummated without conscious adherence to communist or other
Marxist ideology, and the small Communist Party of Cuba jumped on the Castro bandwagon only after years of dismissing him as a hopeless romantic. If
Castro was ready to conduct friendly relations with the communist bloc, it
was in pursuit of a neutralist rather than a pro-Communist policy.
Fourthly, if the Cuban revolution has not yet taken on settled forms of
political institutions, it is because the revolution itself is not yet over, In such
a situation, political institutions for protection of minorities can only serve the
purpose of protecting counter-revolutionaries before the consummated revolution can produce its own form of politics. It is, therefore, better to keep the
present fluid politics, so that the social momentum can be maintained. Besides,
the expansion of educational facilities for so illiterate a people is a more pressing need than holding elections. Hence the emphasis on school expansion and
experiments like the "school cities" and youth "brigades."
Finally, whatever the intentions of the Fidelists to combine socialism with
political freedom and to pursue an independent neutralist foreign policy, the
realization of these goals has been made virtually impossible by the attitude
of the United States government. Instead of taking the initiative in reorienting
its Latin American policy by offering aid to the Castro regime when it first
came to power, the United States withheld aid while our non-official attitude
reflected outright hostility. In the chain of events that followed, each of our
acts or failures to act produced retaliation on Castro's part, while the Soviet
Union played its cards shrewdly enough to reap the major benefits. The consequence has been the postponement of political freedom and a foreign policy
which has moved away from neutralism to friendly relations with the communist bloc.
So brief a summary of Mills' book cannot, of course, do justice to the
argument presented there. Many of the analyses are worth pondering over
at some length; and the whole thesis is so different from the popular American
image of Castro that honest scholarship can only welcome it as an antidote to
an otherwise one-sided picture.
But this is far from saying that the argument in Listen, Yankee is conclusive. On the contrary, the book opens more lines of inquiry than it closes.
Take some of the economic questions for example. Is it true that the total effect
of the Castro revolution will be a net economic gain for Cuba? Will Cuba be
able to compensate through stepped-up economic contact with the rest of the
world (including the communist bloc) for the loss of the American sugar market? Can Cuba make up with Communist aid for the cessation of American
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industrial capital or was the outflow of American dividends from Cuba so much
greater than the inflow of capital investment as to negate its value? Can one
really expect that Russian or Chinese aid to Cuba will have "no strings"
attached (as Mills' composite Cuban states)? Is there reason to think that the
communist countries will put Cuban interests ahead of their own any more
than the United States did? How serious a setback has the emigration of competent technical personnel been for the prospects of more rapid industrialization? On these and a dozen other major economic questions Mills' Cuban
touches only briefly and with partisan optimism but with little in the way of a
substantial, economic analysis. Yet if the prospect of better economic development is a major justification of Castro's revolution, then answers to such questions are imperative.
On the subject of communist influence within the Castro movement, the
book makes some pertinent general arguments which dispose of certain superficial charges, but again there are serious omissions. Nothing is said of Castro's
brother Raul and Guevara who usually figure at the center of arguments about
Cuban communism, but about whom little in the way of clear, comprehensive
analysis has appeared.
Is it really so clear that all blame for present relations must go to the
United States and none to Castro? While there is nothing in Listen, Yankee
in the way of a chronology of American-Cuban relations, the earliest (negative)
event on which interest is centered is the American refusal to grant aid to
Castro when he visited the United States. But was Castro not all to blame
when he set compensation for expropriated land at tax assessment value?
Might it not be that the extra money it would have cost Cuba would have been
far less than the present cost of the rupture with the United States; and is it
so clear that American policy would have been exactly the same had the
compensation policy been different?
It is pointless to go on multiplying the relevant questions. Suffice it to
say that Listen, Yankee has unsatisfactory or no answers for a host of questions
which are crucial to its thesis. This is not to say, however, that anyone else
has presented more satisfactory answers than Mills. Nor is it to say that
Mills' position is clearly wrong. I am saying simply that the book stimulates
more than it satisfies. But if this is not a good reason to read a book, then we
had better close our libraries and printing presses.
The worst possible attitude to take, however, towards the problems raised
by this book would be to dismiss them as closed, now that Castro's commitment to the communist bloc has become well-nigh conclusive and irreversible.
The most interesting implication of the book, in relation to American foreign
policy, is the possibility that we might have prevented Castro's alignment with
the U.S.S.R. and China if we had gone out of our way to aid Castro with a
substantial program when he first came to power. While it is clear that this
possibility has now become irrelevant in relation to Cuba specifically, it may
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well be of vital significance in a future instance similar to the 26th of July
Movement in Cuba. That being the case, it may be even more crucial than
before to pursue the avenue opened by the book. It may be more crucial
precisely because it is so very difficult to avoid projecting present attitudes
and conclusions into the historical past.
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